A Visit with Fire and Life Safety Educator, Michael McLeieer from the Merrimac (MA) Fire Department

Dayna Hilton

Sun, 05/30/2010 - 18:01

• Fire Prevention and Investigation

One of the ways that I enjoy expanding my knowledge is to visit with other educators from across the country and learn about their fire safety programming.

In the fire safety education arena, there is always room to expand our knowledge, which in turn, can help keep our programming from getting "stale." This knowledge provides ways in which we can reach more of our target audience with the fire safety message, and as a result, help keep those in our community safe.

Fifteen year veteran Firefighter Michael McLeieer, Fire and Life Safety Educator from the Merrimac (MA) Fire Department, feels the same way, as do many of the educators out in the field. Michael professes, "I'm still learning as to what works and improving upon what doesn't work." 
I met Michael at the National Fire Academy a couple of years while taking a Juvenile Intervention Specialist course, and was fascinated with his innovation in fire safety education. I recently visited with Michael, and below, you will find his story. 

Michael, tell us about yourself and how you got started in fire safety education. 

This is my 15th anniversary in the fire service. I was approached by a friend of mine, who was a firefighter; 15 years ago about how many children needlessly die in house fires. He explained to me that children often hide from the smoke and fire when they are scared and don't know what to do.  When I went with this Fire Lieutenant to school presentations, I was amazed when he asked the students "What do you do when your house catches fire?" they would respond with "Stop, Drop and Roll". Children we encountered were not "getting" the real fire safety message.

It was at that time that we started a non-profit charity called E.S.C.A.P.E. Inc. (Education Showing Children and Adults Procedures for Evacuations) and built a 27-foot fire safety trailer to use as an interactive educational tool and to mentor and assist fire departments across Michigan in delivering fire and life safety education. I started in the fire service in Michigan in 1995 and in 2000, accepted my current position of Director of Public Education for the Merrimac (MA) Fire Dept. To date E.S.C.A.P.E. has educated over 500,000 children and adults in fire safety and have had 32 documented educational "saves". In my roll as Public Education Officer for Merrimac Fire, we have had four documented "Young Heroes" from 2004 - 2007.

Have there been educators that you have looked up to throughout your career?

I have had fire department training officers or fire academy instructors who I have looked up to as mentors to me.

How did they influence you?

They reminded me to always excel and strive for excellence. They encouraged me to be flexible, yet consistent in the educational approach.

Please share with us what resources you utilize in your programming and why you find these resources useful.

A combination of N.F.P.A., The Idea Bank, Sydistar, Disney Productions, and ideas obtained from various training conferences over the past 15 years. I'm still learning as to what works and improving upon what doesn't work.

What has been the most challenging aspect of being a fire safety educator?

Funding, or the lack of consistent funding. With the ups and downs of the economy, we must continue to reach out to our community and other funding partners to meet our goals and objectives of providing quality fire and life safety educational programs.

You have a successful program with your canine, Jake. Please tell us more about the project.

Jake the fire dog, a black Labrador retriever service canine, is the first service canine to be used exclusively to teach children about fire and life safety. As an English version of the black lab, Jake is more refined and low-key with children than some other breeds. He has his own photo identification, is licensed as a working service animal, and is recognized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and ADA as a working service canine, with his sole purpose being public education, since dogs could be used as agents of terrorism.

In April 2007, Scott D. Maker and I became handlers of Jake and added him to our non-profit public charity, E.S.C.A.P.E. Inc. (Education Showing Children and Adults Procedures for Evacuations).

As Jake's primary handler and trainer, Scott spends two hours each day teaching Jake how to act out
messages such as "crawl low under smoke", "get out and stay out", and "stop, drop and roll."  Jake  teaches children about fire and life safety in both the Great Lakes and New England regions including Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Our goal of teaching children in these regions is to be proactive rather than reactive. We work with area fire departments and go into schools and daycare centers, utilizing our own customized age appropriate lesson plans, to teach and reinforce these positive messages. Jake is just one way to teach those messages, but his presence has helped the educational community to welcome the program with open arms.

In the winter months, the lessons include ice and cold water safety, such as never venturing onto thin ice. In the spring, students learn about topics like bicycle helmet safety and stranger danger. Jake is also used to teach children never to go up to a strange animal without adult supervision.

Jake has learned to demonstrate making the "right choice", such as not hiding under a bed if there is fire or smoke conditions (applicable for younger children) and not using tobacco products that could result in fires (for older children).

Jake will be able to work as a service dog until he is 10 to 12 years old, when typical hip and joint problems will likely interfere with his demonstrations.

We will continue to utilize Jake in assisting to deliver our fire and life safety and juvenile firesetter intervention programs, including reaching out to audiences with disabilities, such as autism and hearing impairments. Jake has even learned sign language commands so he is able to reach out to more target groups.

In addition, Jake demonstrates the following messages:

• Fall and crawl under smoke
• Get out and stay out
• Whisper (inside voice vs. outside voice)
• How to be a helper
• How to stretch before exercising
• Know two ways out
• Stop, drop and roll
• What is a tool and what is a toy
• Waive to his audiences on command
• Sit, speak, whisper, and stay - following sign language commands

What tips or resources can you provide for fire and life safety educators that have limited or no budgets? 

Start building rapport within your community. Visit the service clubs (i.e. Rotary, Moose, Elks, Mason, etc.) and partner with your local banker, local big box stores, anyone and everyone where you can convince them that their investment is necessary to keeping the community safe. Apply for grants. There are a lot of them out there, but anything worth while takes WORK. Don't be afraid to work to spread the word about your department's financial needs. Utilize the media to help get the word out to the community.

If you could share one tip with a fire safety educator just getting their feet wet in fire safety education, what would it be?  

Partner with another seasoned Fire and Life Safety Educator. Learn from peers to avoid making the same mistakes many of us did when we first started out. Make sure the subject matter is familiar to the educator (don't shoot from the hip) and reach out to School Educators or take an early childhood development class...go where the teachers go to learn...a community college. 

What are some of your favorite fire safety related sites on the web? 

Rescue 1 Fire Safety for Kids. Jeff Steere is the President and a career firefighter with the City of Grand Rapids Michigan Fire Department. Jeff and I have become friends and have teamed up together with our two non-profit charities to reach out to more communities and mentor more fire departments within Michigan and across the country.  In fact, our two charities where just recently nominated for the second year in a row as a semi-finalist for the 2010 Connecting with Community Award in Michigan.  The award ceremony will be held on May 13th 2010 at the Gerald Ford Presidential Museum in Grand Rapids Michigan.

 Where do you see fire safety education in ten years?

It will remain a high priority for the U.S. Fire Administration and should be a key focus for the fire service. Education and enforcement of fire and building codes will continue to save lives. The fire service is being asked to do more, with less and less funding, and staffing, and quality fire and life safety education will be the best way for the fire service to continue to be proactive, vs. reactive; preventing fires before they start through education.

 Any last thoughts?

New or seasoned fire service professionals need to remain committed to their passion and this should include education. It's not somebody else's job. It's every firefighter's job to educate and re-educate the public! Especially during tough fiscal times, administration may or will cut or eliminate fire and life safety education, but by keeping good records and proving what we are doing is working (i.e. a reduction in fires, reduction in property loss, reduction in loss of life, etc.), we will be able to argue our case and justify our needs and existence to the elected officials. I never thought I would become adjunct faculty and teaching for the National Fire Academy when I entered the fire service 15 years ago. As Dr. Denis Onieal, NFA Superintendant, told me after I was approached to become an instructor for NFA, "You will change America, here's your opportunity" and I try to do that with every class I teach and every firefighter I have the pleasure and honor in meeting. We ALL have the ability to rise above the financial crisis and should not become easily discouraged. It's up to us to make a difference and change behavior both within the fire service, and among the general public.
 

To learn more about Michael's fire safety programming, please contact him at 978-346-4731 or michael.mcLeieer@merrimacfire.com. 

From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

Christopher J. Naum

Fri, 05/21/2010 - 10:00

• Strategy and Tactics

From Waldbaum's to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

I started this article with the title "From Waldbaum's to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety"; I still find it surprising during my travels around the country lecturing and presenting programs on building construction, that when the audience was asked, "What do the Walbaum's Fire and Hackensack fire share in common?", the response typically were blank stares. The more seasoned and experienced veterans (translation; Older firefighters) when present, were able to convey some information on the subject. But yet, the true essence of the basic incident particulars and the lessons learned fail to be fully conveyed. We're not remembering the past!

I've spoken on numerous occasions about History Repeating Events (HRE), and the common themes related to LODD. Events that resonate with common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, we fail a times to learn from the past, or we make a deliberate choice to ignore those lessons due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints. We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny.

When you look over these LODD events over the years (NIOSH, NFPA, USFA Reports), it doesn't take long to identify that many LODD events share similarities, and that specific incident events, deficiencies, outcomes and recommendations are identical in every way, except for the fire department name and geographical location. In other words, we have History Repeating Events (HRE).

What have we learned from the past? What is it that we're passing down to each incoming recruit class and probationary firefighter? What are Company and Commanding Officers recalling and considering in their dynamic risk assessment, size-up and decision-making (IAP) process when looking at a particular building, occupancy and fire? Are mission critical operational elements & HRE factors being recollected? (Naturalistic/ Recognition-Prime Decision-making).

Are the fire service legacies of the past and the lessons learned from those incidents and the sacrifices that were made transcending time? Or are they lost in the immediacy of day to day challenges, issues and operations. Or are these events, lessons and operations issues dismissed and disregarded as a result of their "time and place" not being relevant to "today's" operations and modern fire service advancements.

The reality is, we, the present generation of veteran firefighters and officers at times neglect or fail to recognize the importance of passing along the lessons of our life's journey through our fire service careers, the events of our day and the profound tough lessons and sacrifices learned the hard way. We sometimes need a receptive, sympathetic and compassionate audience that is willing to listen, hear and comprehend the messages conveyed. There needs to be a high degree of empathy related to these past History Repeating Events. For each event, each and every line of duty death has a message and a Legacy of Operational Safety.

Throughout the past thirty-three years (1977-2010), over 4,000 firefighters have lost their lives in the course and conduct of their duties as firefighters and officers within the fire service. Although there are numerous LODD fire incidents and events that could be discussed, all distinguished and exemplified by heroism, nobility, cause and fortitude. There are four that stand out when related to the lessons learned and the significance and impact each LODD incident had at the time to the national fire service.

Each of these incidents also have significance as they relate to the building, occupancy, use, construction features, inherent structural systems, fire behavior and fire dynamics; coupled with interrelated elements of strategic and tactical fire suppression operations and incident management . Again, "Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety".

The Waldbaum's Supermarket Fire: Brooklyn, New York August 3, 1978
Six LODD
Six FDNY firefighters died at this fire when the wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, 34 were injured. The fire started at 8:40 hrs. in Waldbaum's Supermarket, Ave. Y and Ocean Ave., Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, NY. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers etc ., were in the process of renovating the building, while it was still open and operating when the fire started in the mezzanine area. An All hands was transmitted at 08:49 hrs. the 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 hrs., with 20 firefighters on the roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the bow string trussed roof fell into the smoke and flames. A total of 12 firefighters fell into the inferno, six were rescued, six died in the line of duty.

Honor and Remembrance
• Lt. James Cutillo, 33rd Battalion
• Firefighter Charles Bouton, Ladder Co. 156
• Firefighter William O'Conner, Ladder Co. 156
• Firefighter James P McManus, Ladder Co. 153
• Firefighter George Rice, Ladder Co. 153
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Ladder Co.153

Hackensack Ford: Hackensack, New Jersey July 1, 1988
Five LODD
Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed in the line-of duty while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building's wood bowstring truss roof collapsed.

Honor and Remembrance
• Captain Richard Williams
• Lt. Richard Reinhogen
• Firefighter William Krejsa
• Firefighter Leonard Radumski
• Firefighter Stephen Ennis

Note: The 1988 Hackensack Ford Fire occurred almost ten years to the date of the Waldbaum's FDNY Fire in 1978. (History Repeating Event…we forgot something along the way regarding bow string trussed roof systems and fire impingement...)

As a result of this incident passage of a NJ State law mandating the clear demarcation of truss roofs and other structural hazards with warning signs (placards) on building with truss roofs was. In 1991 NJ State law required the State Bureau of Fire Safety to investigate all fires in which a firefighter dies or is seriously injured. See National Truss Placarding.

The Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Fire: Worcester, Massachusetts, December 3, 1999
Six LODD
On December 3, 1999, the vacant, six-story Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. building in Worcester, Massachusetts, was set ablaze by two homeless people knocking a lighted candle into a pile of ragged clothes. The Worcester Fire Department responded at 6:13 p.m. to Box Alarm 1438. The Rescue 1 team of Firefighter Paul Brotherton and Firefighter Jerry Lucey entered the building searching for occupants. Fire conditions worsened in the building at an alarmingly unexpected rate. Paul and Jerry, on the fifth floor, became disoriented in the smoke-filled building. Lost, and running low on air, they called for help. Several teams began searching for the lost fire fighters.

Two teams reaching the fifth floor also found themselves disoriented in the smoke and trapped by the maze of interior walls — Lieutenant Tom Spencer and Firefighter Tim Jackson from Ladder 2, and Firefighter Jay Lyons and Firefighter Joe McGuirk from Engine 3. Though many more brave fire fighters attempted to locate their missing brothers, their efforts proved futile. Their deaths marked the worst loss of fire fighters' lives in more than 20 years in a building fire in America, and the third worst fire in Massachusetts' history. Six days after they died, a memorial service drew 30,000 fire fighters and 10,000 civilians in what was believed to have been the largest such service for fire fighters killed on duty.

Honor and Remembrance
• Firefighter Paul A Brotherton, Rescue Co.1
• Firefighter Timothy P. Jackson, Ladder Co.2
• Firefighter Jeremiah M. Lucey, Rescue Co.1
• Firefighter James F. "Jay" Lyons III, Engine Co. 3
• Firefighter Joseph T. McGuirk , Engine Co. 3
• Lt. Thomas E. Spencer, Ladder Co.2

Sofa Superstore Fire: Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007
Nine LODD
On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters. The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly, affecting the building's structural integrity and adversely affecting manual fire suppression activities.

Honor and Remembrance
• Bradford Rodney "Brad" Baity – Engineer 19
• Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
• Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
• James "Earl" Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
• Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
• William H. "Billy" Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
• Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
• Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
• Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5

Commemorate and Remembrance
On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters.

The Executive Summary of the FIREFIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Sofa Super Store Fire, Phase II Report issued MAY 15, 2008 provided critical insights into the apparent and contributing causes that culminated in the event. The Sofa Super Store was a large property that incorporated a very significant potential for a major fire to occur. It's appropriate at this time to revisit those key factors described within the report in order for provide the opportunity for departments or agencies to recognize or identify similar gaps that exist, and take the necessary corrective actions. These gaps may be precursors to potentially significant or serious future events and extend in operational, training, administrative, managerial, construction, prevention and regulatory and codes.

• The fire risk factors associated with the Sofa Super Store exceeded the limits prescribed by the applicable building and fire codes. An automatic sprinkler system should have been installed to reduce the level of fire risk or the buildings should have been divided into manageable fire compartments by a system of fire walls.
• If a sprinkler system had been installed, the fire probably would likely have been controlled within the loading dock area.
• If effective fire walls had been provided, the fire probably would not have spread beyond the loading dock.
• The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly. The burning contents released copious quantities of heat and toxic smoke.
• Significant quantities of flammable and combustible liquids that were stored in the loading dock likely contributed to the severity and rapid spread of the fire.
• The fire had extended to the loading dock when firefighters arrived.
• Charleston Fire Department members attempted to fight the fire by initiating an offensive interior attack into the loading dock.
• The offensive attack was launched from two directions. One attack line entered the loading dock from the exterior, while a second line was stretched through the showrooms and into the loading dock.
• The offensive attack failed to control the fire. The fire extended into adjoining areas on three sides of the loading dock.
• At least 16 firefighters, who were operating deep inside the showrooms, became enveloped in heavy smoke.
• Conditions inside the showrooms became critical as the fire began to involve this part of the building. Several firefighters became disoriented and were running short of air. Radio messages requesting assistance were not heard.
• Seven firefighters managed to find their way out of the showrooms. The nine deceased firefighters were unable to find their way out as the fire spread rapidly from the rear of the building to the front.
• The size and layout of the building, inadequate exits, and the highly flammable nature of the contents likely contributed to the inability of the lost firefighters to escape from the building. Rescue efforts were attempted when the situation inside the showrooms was recognized. In spite of valiant efforts, it was too late to save the missing firefighters before the store became fully involved in flames.

The analysis of operations conducted by the Charleston Fire Department includes the following observations and findings:

• Fire fighting operations at the Sofa Super Store did not comply with Federal occupational safety and health regulations, recommended safety standards, or accepted fire service practices.
• The Charleston Fire Department failed to provide adequate direction, supervision, and coordination over the operations that were conducted.
• The documented duties and responsibilities of an Incident Commander were not performed and risk management guidelines were not adequately applied to the situation.
• The culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefighters to excessive and avoidable risks and failed to apply basic firefighter safety practices.
• Insufficient training, inadequate staffing, obsolete equipment and outdated tactics all contributed to an ineffective effort to control the fire with offensive tactics during the early stages of the incident.
• The Charleston Fire Department continued to apply offensive tactics after the situation had evolved to a point where risk management guidelines called for defensive strategy.
• Factors that should have caused firefighters to be removed from interior tactical (offensive) positions were not recognized.
• There was a lack of accountability for the location and function of firefighters who were operating inside the building. The Charleston Fire Department did not have appropriate Mayday procedures to be followed by firefighters in distress, for dispatchers, or for command officers on the scene.

All of the listed factors and many others were analyzed and discussed in detail within the body of the issued report. If you haven't found the time or reason to read the report, do so; it would make for a good task activity for Safety Week. The report document presented the dedicated and conscientious efforts of the review team to honor the nine fallen firefighters by making every possible effort to learn from their sacrifice. The operative question is this; "What factors or attributes are comparable to situations or conditions that presently exist within your Department, Organization or community? What are you going to proactively do to address these issues or conditions in a timely manner?

Understanding the Building Profile and Risk
The Sofa Super Store occupied a complex of interconnected structures that had been constructed in several phases. The showroom building, facing Savannah Highway, was actually an assembly of three separate structures. The front wall was a façade, with a parapet extending above the roof line, creating the appearance of one large building when viewed from Savannah Highway. (Refer to the Report for diagrams, plans and photographs)
• The front wall, including the parapet, was approximately 23 feet tall, while the roof behind the parapet varied from 12 to 14 feet above grade.
• The main showroom was originally constructed as a grocery store, probably during the 1950s or 60s. The original building was approximately 125 feet in width and 130 feet deep, with a rectangular extension in the southwest corner (right-rear facing the building from Savannah Highway).
• The front wall was brick construction with large storefront windows, while the side and rear walls were constructed of concrete block.
• The original structure had a flat metal deck roof, supported by lightweight steel bar joists (trusses), spanning from east to west across the store. The side walls supported the ends of the bar joists, while two rows of steel beams and columns provided intermediate support.
• A suspended ceiling was installed below the roof trusses.

After the property was converted to a furniture store, two pre-engineered metal buildings were added-on to the original structure to expand the showroom area. Each showroom addition was approximately 60 feet in width and 120 feet deep. The first showroom addition was constructed on the west side of the original building in 1994 and the second was added on the east side in 1995. (The add-on structures are referred to as the east and west showrooms in this report, while the original structure is identified as the main showroom.) Six large openings in the concrete block side walls, three on each side of the original building, provided connections between the showroom areas; their combined floor area was in excess of 31,000 square feet. An additional pre-engineered metal structure was erected at the rear of the property in 1996 to serve as a warehouse. This structure was approximately 120 feet wide by 130 feet deep and 29 feet tall. Furniture was stored on steel racks, 20 feet in height, inside the warehouse.

Going Forward: The Structural Anatomy of Building Construction
The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988

"If you don't fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner."

"This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You're just not doing your job effectively and you're at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it's that simple, it's that obvious".

Risk Based Response Assignments
The buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts pose unique and consistent challenges during structural fire attack. The variety of occupancies and building characteristics establish varying degrees of risk potential, with defined and recognizable strategic and tactical measures to be taken-sometimes uniquely to each occupancy type. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This is based on what I define as; "predictability of performance."

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system.

We used to know with a measured degree of predictability, how our buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. This is what our years of fireground experience provided us, and how we ultimately would predict, assess, plan and implement our incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected. Conventional Construction Structures (CCS) had this "predictably of performance." You know, that typical residential structure, the 2-1/2 story wood frame, the three story brick and joist type III occupancy, the four story frame multiple occupancy, etc., etc. Unlike Engineered System Structures (ESS) whose predictability is rooted in the fact that they are unpredictable.

The emerging fire service issues affecting buildings, occupancies and structural systems related to ESS is only beginning to take hold a prominent role and level of significance that is long overdue. The fire service has been dealing with the operational issues and line-of-duty deaths related to ESS since the 1980s and now in 2009, we're finally raising these ESS issues to a dialog point that is influencing firefighter safety, survival and operations. ( Refer to the Underwriters Laboratory's (UL) UL University on-line training module for a state-of-the art presentation on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions and performance results that correlate towards redefining fire suppression operations)

The fire service is beginning to fully recognize the merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets. It's becoming self evident in the fire service that it's no longer acceptable to think that ESS buildings and occupancies will perform in the same manner as CCS buildings and occupancies and that tactics deployed in both CCS and ESS buildings and occupancies will react under similar strategic and tactical plans and tasks. These unique and inherent factors within the ESS profiles must give us a new standard for operational deployment; strategies and tactics that are defined by the risk profile of the building, its engineered structural systems, materials and methods of construction and the fire loading present.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environment- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

Risk-Preferring and Self-indulging Firefighting
Don't mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference. When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans. These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

It's no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments. Consider the following definitions as they relate to defining structural combat fire suppression operations.

Aggressive and Measured Approach.
Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…
Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…
You be the judge as to what should be appropriately defining interior fire suppression operations.

It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management. This is what it's going to take to truly provide a means for "everyone to go home".

Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type
Many of today's incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today's buildings, construction and occupancies. We assume that the redundancy of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions. Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

With this being stated, another primary consideration that must be deliberated and changed as it relates to firefighting and the built environment is the long held fire service tradition and practice of Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments being based upon the Occupancy Type. Sending the two Engine Companies and one Truck Company assignment with a Battalion Chief and a RIT team to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure; is not acceptable.

As previously stated; the rules for structural fire engagement have changed. Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments should be based upon the Risk Profile the occupancy has related to Building construction, systems and projected or determined fire loading. Sending the four Engine Companies, two Truck Companies, a manpower Heavy Rescue Company, two additional Battalion Chiefs, a Safety Officer and support staff assignment with the assigned Battalion Chief on the alarm assignment to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure, that happens to be 5000 square feet in size with ESS components; IS Acceptable.

• There is an acute understanding and corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory, This is a fact.
• Previous, historical parameters and Building/Structural Performance always provides a postulated measurement to gauge operational tasks and form the basis for the Incident Action Plan. These parameters must be recognized and integrated
• There is a need to integrate performance based incident indicators derived from engineering, physics, fire dynamics, historical and statistical basis
• Basic Size-Up is Antiquated for Firefighting and the Built Environment. – Start Thinking in terms of Dynamic Risk Assessment and Command Risk Management
• USFA Annual Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States
"More firefighters using an aggressive interior attack in enclosed structures die more often, in greater numbers, and with greater multiple line-of-duty deaths than those using the same tactical approach in opened structure fires."
Start integrating an understating of Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior and the impact on structural integrity and operational deployment
Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment
Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.

Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken. This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.

To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what's going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety.
The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.
Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm's way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

It's Not about Our Entertainment Value
When we focus our attention on the interdependent functional domains of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it's all about, is it not? The reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails; has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. We enjoy it tremendously; because of who we are and what we do-as firefighters. But, firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths.

As a firefighter, to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, but one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the "enjoyment and entertainment" of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.-Staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that does not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle time and operating time in the fire.

Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspect in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction. If we understand buildings, occupancies and construction, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). It's all about the Structural Anatomy of Buildings.

The Journey: It's a Matter of Trust

By Christopher Flatley, Firehouse.Com Contributor

Web Exclusive included with this article

This article continues our discussion on the journey to fire service leadership. As I said in the first article, it is the journey to leadership that builds our character. Our character is shaped along the way by all the twists and turns on the path of life. It is our character that we will rely on when we reach our destination. In this installment we will be discussing trust.

Welcome
Viewing this article requires a subscription to Firehouse magazine. If you are not currently a subscriber to Firehouse magazine, subscribe today and gain on demand web access to our current issue in its entirety.

Subscribe Today!

Building Collapse Operations - Part 1

By Michael P. Daley, Firehouse.Com Contributor


Building Collapse Operations - Part 1
Scene assessment skills come from construction and collapse knowledge

Note: Michael P. Daley will be teaching "Firefighting Operations in Basements and Cellars" at Firehouse Expo, in Baltimore, on July 23, 2010. Later that day he will be a panelist on the Radio@Firehouse Podcast looking at basement fire tactics.

Web Exclusive included with this article

Today's emergency responder will find themselves responding to a more diverse assortment of alarms. It would not be uncommon for initial responding units to find themselves "first due" to a reported structural collapse. Without proper training and preparation, these responders will find themselves inadequately prepared for this type of operation. This month, we will focus our attention on collapse planning and preparation, common safety issues, collapse assessment, and response considerations.

It is important to understand the need for thorough planning for this type of response. Structural collapses are not a normal, everyday occurrence for most responders. This alone sets up an opportunity for catastrophic injury, as rescuers are more prone to injury while performing skills that they do not use regularly, at incidents that they do not train on regularly. Most people are of the mindset that, since the potential to respond to a collapse incident in their jurisdiction is minimal at best, the need for thorough training in this category is minimal as well. In fact, the rarity of this type of event helps to confirm the need for more training in this discipline (see Photo 1). This lack of, or inadequate level of training, can be linked to a number of on-scene issues:

Failure of the Incident Command System: The dynamic intensity of the scene will overwhelm an inexperienced officer, and it is up to the incident commander (IC) to keep control of the incident. Moreover, should the collapse happen after initial units are on scene (for example: resulting from a fire), the potential of responder injury or loss will certainly create a chaotic scene for the IC.

Freelancing: A large amount of rescuers will be a necessity on scene, performing a variety of tasks, including search, air monitoring, medical triage, and fire suppression, just to name a few. With a high risk of changing conditions on-scene, it is important to stay accountable for all rescuers operating on scene (see Photo 2).

Hazardous Materials Presence: Rescuers who are operating at a collapse can become complacent of their surroundings while focusing on their tasks at hand. Collapses at occupancies with a high hazmat potential (hardware stores, plumbing supply stores, agricultural supply stores) will serve as an additional hazard as rescuers are working their way through the rubble pile.

Communication Overload: Many agencies have the capability to talk on a variety of different frequencies. The reality is that there are some agencies nationwide that cannot talk with other disciplines that are on-scene (law, fire and EMS). There has to be a plan to handle the on-scene communications. Secondly, there will be rescuers that will have to fight for air time when a frequency gets overloaded. There should be multiple channels for different operations to communicate on, but there should also be interoperability between each, so communications between rescuers can occur.

Self-converging Resources: It is not uncommon for units to self-dispatch to the "big one," especially if it is a local incident. A well planned response protocol will help to confirm the right resources will be called to the incident, when they are needed to respond. Furthermore, these incidents can run through multiple operational periods. If all of the local resources are depleted during the initial response, there will not be an ample supply for the next operational period.

Building Features

Structures are built with two primary objectives in mind: to resist gravity and resist wind shear. In his book, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Frank Brannigan wrote of the "Gravity Resistance System" that is designed into each structure. It is the combination of all of the structural elements and their connections that support the structure, and direct these forces back into the Earth (see Photo 3). This "system" is the design result that keeps the structure from failing under ordinary, everyday usage. To understand this system, a rescuer must have a solid knowledge of building construction. This is of paramount importance. This knowledge helps responders predict smoke and fire behavior; predict how the structure will behave when it is compromised; identify potential rescue problems on scene; types of construction materials that will have to be breached; heavy structural components that will have to be moved; and predict occupant and utility locations (see Photo 4).

Over the years, construction methods and techniques have changed, but what haven't changed are the laws of physics. It is imperative that firefighters have a thorough understanding of how buildings are constructed, and, more importantly, how they can collapse. Many officers have learned their decision-making process through experiences on the fireground; however, the clues that existed in the past, such as sagging floors, racking windows and doors, and smoke coming from separations in walls, may all serve to be "too little, too late." Today, buildings are built with approximately half of the materials used years ago, but are creating almost five times the potential rate of heat release, resulting in faster destruction of structural components, and quicker collapse. It is best to have a grasp on the physical aspects of construction; mainly, gravity, loads, and forces.

Gravity has been called the greatest of firefighter enemies - unforgiving, unpredictable, and always a factor for consideration. Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, gravity is continually exerting forces on a structure. Overall, these stresses may not be apparent, but they are still in place. Loads can be defined as a force or action that is a result of the weight all building materials, occupants, environmental effects, and movement and changes that are applied during the normal use of the structure. Some loads are simply defined, such as a Dead Load, which includes the weight of structural components and all materials attached to the structure, and Live Load, which include anything not permanently affixed to the structure, such as furnishings, occupants, and transient (temporary) materials and occupants. Some can be enviornmental, like wind loads and distributed loads of snow on a structure's roof.

Force In Relation To Building Construction

When discussing forces, it is important to define two separate concepts: stress and strain. Stress, mostly measured in pounds per-square-inch (psi) is that result from the external force that is applied to the structural component. Strain, conversely, is the actual deformation of the component when it is stressed. Strain is usually measured per inch of original length of the component. Generally, there are a few types of forces to be identified:

Compression: A squeezing, compressive force that is placed on an object, pushing both ends towards each other (for example: a loaded upright column)

Tension: A pulling force that is placed on an object, pulling both ends apart (for example: a steel cable on a suspension bridge)

Bending: A directional force placed on the end of an object, with an opposing force placed in the middle of an object (for example: a load placed on the center of a floor joist or continuous beam)

Shearing: A force tangential to the object on which it is acting upon (for example: a pair of scissors; a rivet in an I-Beam, with a downward force on the rivet)

Toqrue: A twisting or torsional force placed on a structural component (for example: a nut on a bolt)

Collapse Characteristics

It is also important that the responders are well-versed in the signs and characteristics that a collapse may occur in their jurisdiction, such as:

Age of the building: Most buildings, as a rule of thumb, have a life span of 75 to 100 years. Lack of proper maintenance will drastically reduce their life span.

Weather: Buildings that are left open to the elements will deteriorate and rot very quickly.

Improper alterations: Building owners that take shortcuts, or alter structural components without a proper knowledge of construction are inviting trouble.

Natural disasters: Hurricanes, tornadoes, and other storms can wreak havoc on a community and can lead to a large collapse response, quickly overwhelming local resources.

Construction collapses: There have been incidents where accidents on construction sites have resulted in catastrophic failures of structures (see Photo 5).

Vehicles into buildings: While most responders treat these incidents as nothing more than "nuisance" alarms, the damaged component can result in a domino effect, bringing down the rest of the structure without any warning.

Gas explosions: The routine "smell of gas" can turn deadly for responders. There have been cases across the country where firefighters have been injured and killed while investigating the source of the "smell" (see Photo 6).

Fires: The incident commander is faced with two problems at these incidents: the first problem is the access to the firefighters that may be trapped due to the collapse. The second problem is that the fire still has to be extinguished. Many departments have trained all of their resources on rescue and none on suppression, with catastrophic results.

Preparation

It would be wise for departments to perform an "Operational Capability Check" for their jurisdiction, to identify their respective collapse potential. Identifying the types of construction in the area, combined with the age of buildings and their usage will help identify high risk structures for collapse.

This check includes an inward view of the department's capabilities. Do the members possess the needed training to handle these types of emergencies? Does the department have the tools necessary to operate on-scene? Can the department handle both single-point responses (localized collapse), and multiple point responses (widespread collapse due to natural disasters, explosions, etc.)? Is there a list of outside agencies and resources that will be needed to respond to the scene, such as engineers, USAR teams, equipment suppliers, etc.? Trying to develop the resource list while developing the incident action plan is not a good idea; it puts the rescuer way behind the proactive curve (see Photo 7).

Changes in construction materials and techniques require first responders to stay current in the field of building construction. While the affects of fire on the structure are always a major concern, the gravity resistance system in a structure can be compromised without warning, and it is up to the responder to handle this issue. Next month, we will be looking at construction types and materials, some common collapse causes associated with each, and different types of collapses.

MICHAEL P. DALEY is a lieutenant and training officer with the Monroe Township, NJ, Fire District No. 3, and is an instructor with the Middlesex County Fire Academy, where he is responsible for rescue training curriculum development. Mike has an extensive background in fire service operations and holds degrees in business management and public safety administration. Mike serves as a rescue officer with the New Jersey Urban Search and Rescue Task Force 1 and is a managing member for Fire Service Performance Concepts, a consultant group that provides assistance and support to fire departments with their training programs and course development. Mike was a panelist on Radio@Firehouse on the Successful Rescue Operations in Today's Fire Service podcast. You can reach Michael by e-mail at: FSEducator@aol.com.